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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States government, along with forty-nine states, announced
on February 8, 2012 that they had reached a settlement (Settlement
Agreement) with five of the largest mortgage servicers in the country for
$25 billion, marking the largest consumer protection settlement in history.'
The government declared that the purpose of the Settlement Agreement
was to remedy the injustices that borrowers faced when they qualified for
modifications on their underwater homes but were foreclosed on without
being given the opportunity for these modifications.2 While proponents of
this Settlement Agreement claim that it will alleviate the rampant
foreclosing practice that servicers have promoted by obligating them to
change their servicing standards, consumer advocates are skeptical that it
will work. These advocates' skepticism arises from the fact that previous
programs have failed to help many people that faced foreclosure due, in
large part, to a lack of a strong enforcement mechanism. 4 Despite the
government's announcement that the Settlement Agreement will not
prevent actions brought by individual borrowers, the language of the
Settlement Agreement, coupled with courts' treatment of similar programs,
seemingly limits enforcement to only the parties named in the Settlement
Agreement.5
1. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Federal Government and State
Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers
to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), available
at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html [hereinafter Settlement
Agreement Announcement] (announcing that Ally Financial, Bank of America,
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo entered into settlement agreements with
government parties due to violations in the use of "robo-signing" foreclosure affidavits,
deceptive practices when offering loan modifications, and failure to offer alternatives to
foreclosure).
2. See id. (declaring that the agreement provides substantial financial relief to
homeowners and establishes significant new homeowner protections for the future).
3. Compare id. (announcing that the agreement will hold mortgage servicers
accountable, allow struggling homeowners to benefit from reduced principals and
refinancing, and ensure the abuses of the past are not repeated), with Gretchen
Morgenson, The Deal Is Done, but Hold the Applause, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/business/mortgage-settlement-leaves-much-to-bedesired-fair-game.html (noting that the greatest obstacle is how the settlement will be
policed since banks have often escaped their promises).
4. See David Dayen, 49-State Foreclosure Fraud Settlement Will Be Finalized

Thursday, FIREDOGLAKE (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:15 PM), http://news.firedoglake.com/
(listing
2012/02/08/49-state-foreclosure-fraud-settlement-will-be-finalized-thursday/
programs, lawsuits, and settlement agreements where the lack of enforcement resulted
in servicer non-compliance).
5. Compare Settlement Agreement at *E-15, United States v. Bank of Am., No.
1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), Docs. 10-14, available at
www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com (follow hyperlinks on right column under
"Settlement Documents") [hereinafter Settlement Agreement] (providing enforcement
action rights only to parties to the agreement), with Settlement Agreement
Announcement, supra note 1 (stating that the individual borrowers who wish to bring
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This Recent Development will argue that like in previous agreements
between the government and servicers, borrowers will not be able to access
courts for violations of the Settlement Agreement because it does not
provide borrowers a private right of action (PRA).6 Part II discusses one of
the first government programs to address foreclosure practices, the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP),7 the interpretive case law
regarding its lack of a PRA, and the Settlement Agreement's key
provisions on enforcement. Part III analyzes the reasoning in HAMP
cases and deduces that courts will find that borrowers will not have a PRA
in the Settlement Agreement.9 Part IV discusses the ramifications of
denying borrowers a PRA, highlights inefficiencies within the current
enforcement plan designed to assess penalties to servicers, and provides
suggestions on how to remedy issues of accountability.10 Part V concludes
that the government is, and has been, hesitant to grant a PRA to borrowers,
and as such, the Settlement Agreement risks meeting the same fate as its
predecessors.1 1
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Home Affordable Modification Program
Established under the Temporary Asset Relief Program in 2008, HAMP
gives the government the authority to use incentive payments to encourage
servicers to modify eligible mortgages so that struggling borrowers'
monthly payments are reduced to affordable and sustainable levels. 12
Home mortgage lenders use servicers to collect monthly payments, approve
or deny borrowers' requests to modify any portion of their loan agreement,
and begin a foreclosure action on behalf of the lender." The government
their own lawsuits may do so).
6. See Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147349, at *20 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (holding that the borrower had no PRA
to a servicing agreement between the servicer and the government that required it to
comply with the Home Affordable Modification Program).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (2012).
8. See infra, Part II.
9. See infra, Part III.
10. See infra, Part IV.
11. See infra, Part V.
12. See HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM, HANDBOOK FOR SERVICERS

57 (2010),
available
at
https://www.hmpadmin.com//portal/programs/docs/hampservicer/
mhahandbook.pdf (describing that as soon as servicers receive compensation, they
must promptly apply part of it to the defaulting borrowers' accounts and remit the rest).
OF NoN-GSE MORTGAGES MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE HANDBOOK

13. See Diane E. Thompson, ForeclosingModifications: How Servicer Incentives
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REv. 755, 761, 764 (describing that

servicers can be an independent company or the lender will have a servicing arm within
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began to promote programs like HAMP after the home mortgage crisis
ensued because servicers were unwilling to modify loans, and instead
foreclosed.14 Under HAMP, the government can enter into either a
Mortgage Selling and Servicing Contract (MSSC) or a Servicer
Participation Agreement (SPA) with participating servicers, which lay out
guidelines that banks are required to follow when considering a
Because servicers have not engaged in as many
modification.' 5
modifications as the government expected and because neither the
government nor borrowers can properly enforce HAMP's guidelines in
court, HAMP is largely seen as a failure.' 6
B. HAMP andIts EnactingAgreements Do Not Provide a Private Right of
Action for Borrowers

The majority of courts have vehemently stated that the government did
not confer a PRA to borrowers under HAMP because it merely suggests,
but does not mandate, that servicers participate. 7 Reluctant borrowers
have tried to sue servicers for violations of HAMP under the theory that
they are intended beneficiaries of either the MSSC or the SPA. ' However,
the majority of courts have found that these derivative contracts also fail to
confer a PRA to borrowers because the parties to the agreements never
intended to make borrowers the type of beneficiaries that had the ability to
sue for violations of these contracts.1 9 In analyzing intent, the court looks
its company).
14. See 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (2012) (encouraging the servicers of the underlying
mortgages to take advantage of available funding programs to minimize foreclosures).
15. See Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270,
at *13-14 (Dec. 15, 2011) (describing that servicers and Fannie Mae entered into a
Servicer Participation Agreement (SPA), which required servicers to use reasonable
efforts to secure modifications for borrowers).
16. See id. at *17 (highlighting the lack of an enforcement mechanism as a
significant flaw of HAMP); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH APRIL 2011, at 2 (2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA(reporting
Reports/Documents/April%202011 %20MHA%2OReport%20FINAL.PDF
that as of April 2011, three years after HAMP's implementation, nearly 1.8 million trial
modifications and about 700,000 permanent modifications were started, where the
Treasury's initial goal was three to four million).
17. See, e.g., Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21, 28 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (giving examples of district
courts from Texas, the District of Columbia, Michigan, and California that found that
HAMP did not confer a PRA); Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, No. 09-cv2450(LB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) (giving
examples of cases from California and Arizona stating there is not a PRA in HAMP).
18. See Parker,2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *27 (stating that the servicer did
not grant borrowers a modification even though they qualified under the HAMP
guidelines).
19. See, e.g., Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21-22 (listing district
courts in Massachusetts and Vermont that determined that SPAs and MSSCs do not
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first to the express language of the contracts and then to sections of the
Restatement of Contracts that deal with intended non-party beneficiaries. 2 0
1. The Express Language of the MSSC and SPA Does Not Confer a PRA
Borrowers have attempted to sue servicers under HAMP servicing
contracts like the MSSC and the SPA on the theory that they are
beneficiaries to the agreements even though they are not parties to the
agreements.21 To determine whether a non-party may maintain an action
under HAMP, courts have looked to the parties' intent.2 2 In doing so,
courts first examine the plain language of the agreement-if the terms of
the contract are clear, the contract itself has been found to demonstrate the
parties' intent. 2 3
In Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., the government and HSBC entered
into an MSSC, which included an enforcement clause stating, "These rights
and remedies are for our benefit and that of our successors and assigns." 2 4
The MSSC Selling Guide also stated, "No borrower or other third party is
intended to be a legal beneficiary of the MSSC or the Selling Guide or
Servicing Guide or to obtain any rights or entitlements through Fannie
Mac's lender communications or contracts." 25 The court found that the
parties did not intend to give borrowers a PRA because they did not name
borrowers as parties to the MSSC, borrowers are not successors or assigns
of the parties to the MSSC, and the Selling Guide expressly excluded
borrowers from the ability to sue under the agreement. 26 Despite being
sympathetic to the borrowers' contract claims, the Parker v. Bank of
extend to homeowners standing to assert a breach of contract claim as non-party
beneficiaries); Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *18-19 (listing district courts
in California, Nevada, and Florida that did the same).
20. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19-26 (analyzing first, whether
the plain language of the MSSC clearly indentified the borrowers as beneficiaries, then
whether the borrowers were intended beneficiaries, and finally, whether they can

overcome the presumption of being incidental beneficiaries to government contracts
with no power to sue).
21. See, e.g., Parker, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *10-11 (dismissing
borrower claim that it is a direct beneficiary of a party between the servicer and the
government).
22. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *17 (citing McCarthy v. Azure,
22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994)).
23. See id. at *18 (stating that if the contract is unclear, a court may assess the
parties' intent by inquiring into the reasonableness of the putative beneficiary's reliance
on the intent manifested in the promise).
24. See id. at *19 (citing to section XIV of the agreement); see also Rivera, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) (finding that the SPA had
the same clause and did not confer a PRA to borrowers).
25. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19-20 (citing to section A2-101 of the MSSC Selling Guide).
26. See id. at *19-20 (finding that, from the plain language of the agreements,
borrowers are not intended to be beneficiaries of the contract).
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America court also denied the borrower standing on a direct beneficiary
claim of a contract between the government and a servicer because the
borrowers were not parties to the SPA.27
2. BorrowersAre Not Intended Beneficiariesof the MSSC or the SPA
Borrowers have also tried to sue servicers for violations of HAMP on the
theory that they are intended "non-party" or "third-party" beneficiaries,
those who have enforcement powers, to the MSSC and the SPA.28 With
very few exceptions, district courts that have considered this question have
rejected the borrowers' position. 2 9 To determine whether enforcement is
permissible by a non-party to a government contract, courts look to the
Restatement of Contracts because federal-and most state-contract laws
follow it. 30 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 302(1) provides
that an "intended beneficiary" is one who has "a right to performance by
the promisee and . .. the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance." 31 An
intended beneficiary, whether a named party or not, has the right to sue
under the contract, and an incidental beneficiary, a non-party who
indirectly benefits from the contract, does not have that right.32 Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 313(2), however, citizens are

presumed to be incidental beneficiaries of government contracts, unless a
non-party to the government agreement shows that the terms of the contract
itself or the policy underlying it would clearly support the classification as
an intended beneficiary who can sue the promisor directly.33
In Markle, the court agreed that the government intended to provide
27. See Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270,
at * 10-11 (Dec. 15, 2011) (dismissing the action based on insufficient evidence that
there was an existing contract between the borrower and defendants).
28. See, e.g., id. at *11 (explaining that the borrower is suing under violation of
HAMP's SPA as a third-party beneficiary); Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at
*9; Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *11 (explaining that the borrower is
suing under a violation of HAMP's MSSC as a third-party beneficiary).
29. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21-22 (listing district courts
around the country that determined that government agreements under HAMP do not
extend to homeowners standing as non-party beneficiaries).
30. See Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *12 ("Federal common law, in
deciding whether a non-party beneficiary may sue, looks to the same considerations as
does the Restatement of Contracts." (quoting Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 575 F.
Supp. 677, 680 (E.D.N.Y. 1983))).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (stating the
elements needed to prove an individual is an intended beneficiary).
32. See id. at § 302(2) ("An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an
intended beneficiary.").
33. See id § 313(2) (explaining that a promisor who contracts with a government is
not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for damages resulting from
performance or failure to perform).
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borrowers a benefit by implementing HAMP, but found that borrowers are
not intended beneficiaries because the borrowers did not offer evidence of a
clear intent sufficient to overcome the presumption of being mere
incidental beneficiaries to government contracts under HAMP, the MSSC,
and the MSSC Selling Guide.3 4 On the other hand, the MSSC and the
MSSC Selling Guide are very clear as to who were the parties and
beneficiaries to the agreement. 35 The court also warned that allowing such
an indefinite and broad class of non-party beneficiaries would be contrary
to the clear intent standard for government contracts as recognized by the
Restatement. 36 Similarly, Rivera v. Bank of America Home Loans also
found that borrowers are intended to benefit from HAMP and its
However, the court found that borrowers could not
agreements.3 7
overcome the presumption of being only incidental beneficiaries because
the terms of the agreement preclude borrowers from enforcing the SPA as
the SPA's provisions do not expressly allow borrowers to enforce the
agreement and provide that remedies are solely available to the
government.
A handful of courts, including the Parker court, have found that
borrowers are intended non-party beneficiaries. 39 These courts found that
borrowers are "undeniably" intended beneficiaries because, following the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 302(1), servicers are required to
perform under the SPA and that performance is intended to directly benefit
borrowers struggling to pay first mortgages on their residences. 40 The court
also found that borrowers overcame the presumption that they were merely
incidental parties because the SPA did not expressly prevent borrowers
from suing and borrowers had no other forum to bring their claims, which
34. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21 (arguing that the borrowers
have not offered evidence to overcome the presumption of incidental beneficiary).
35. See id. at *20 (stating that it appears clear through the contract language that
the contracting parties did not intend to extend enforcement rights to non-parties).
36. See id. at *19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2)).
37. See Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, No. 09-cv-2450(LB), 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 43138, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) (agreeing with the District Court for
the Southern District of California that HAMP and its agreements express a clear intent
to benefit eligible borrowers).
38. See id. at *17-18 (reciting from the SPA that the enforcement clause only
permitted parties and its successors to enforce the agreement, and the remedies for
default were only available to Fannie Mae).
39. See, e.g., Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS
270, at *18-20 (Dec. 15, 2011) (citing Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,
No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81879, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
2010). But see Picini v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 11-CV-2393(JS)(GRB), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22502, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2012) (criticizing Parker for
following the reasoning of a case that no other court in the district has followed).
40. See Parker, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *22 (reasoning this was the
entire purpose of enacting HAMP).
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demonstrated a "clear intent to the contrary" that they were intended
beneficiaries. 41 The Parker court based most of its argument on Marques
v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., which found that borrowers could
sue servicers on a non-party beneficiary theory.42 Only three courts have
cited to Parker but all three stopped short of following the case, and one
criticized the opinion.43 Almost every other court, including those in the
same district as Parker, has refused to view borrowers as non-party
* * 44
beneficiaries.

C. Behind the Settlement Agreement: Its Enforcement
Power and the Role ofBorrowers
The Settlement Agreement is a part-federal, part-state government
contract whose purpose is to provide more modifications to a greater
number of borrowers by obligating servicers to comply with new servicing
These standards include requiring servicers to notify
standards.45
borrowers of modification options, offering modifications rather than
initiating foreclosure, and expediting the conversion of trial modifications
to permanent ones. 4 6 The borrowers from the forty-nine participating states
who will benefit from this Settlement Agreement are those currently
seeking a home loan modification or who will seek one in the future.4 7 The
five servicers who are parties to the agreement are the largest servicers of
home mortgage loans found to have committed violations of fair lending
41. See id. at *26-27 (opining that the denial of non-party beneficiary status to
persons aggrieved by such violations would mock the very goals of the program that
the contract was intended to further).
42. Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., No. 09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81879, *19 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010) ("Plaintiff may be able to state
a claim against Defendant as an intended beneficiary of the Agreement.").
43. See Akar v. Fannie Mae, No. 10-10539-NGM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16360,
at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2012) (citing opinion regarding borrower's fraud claim);
L'Esperance v. HSBC Consumer Lending, Inc., No. 11-cv-55-LM, 2012 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 11753, at *23 (D.N.H. Feb. 1, 2012) (citing opinion for the possibility of
allowing SPA breach claim but denying it at this instance); Barbas v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, No. 11-1153, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 257, at *5 (Dec. 15, 2011)
(citing opinion); see also Picini, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22502, at *12 (criticizing
opinion's statement that it was following Marques while the judge knew almost every
other court in Massachusetts rejected the Marques holding).
44. See Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147349, at *23 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (citing to several district courts from
Massachusetts that dismissed borrowers' claims under this theory).
45. See Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (stating that the
agreement was a joint state and federal government effort to come to terms that
servicers have to follow in order to provide borrowers modifications).
46. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *3, *4, *A-4 (using metrics that
calculate that the servicer is following these procedures and allowing more
modifications).
47. See Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (claiming that the
agreement will benefit the borrowers).
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practices laws. 4 8
The Settlement Agreement was filed in the United States District Court
of the District of Columbia as a Consent Judgment. 4 9 The enforcement
clause of the agreement states, "An enforcement action under this Consent
Judgment may be brought by any Party to this Consent Judgment or the
Monitoring Committee." 50 The parties to the agreement are the U.S.
government, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, and the five
servicers.5 1 The Settlement Agreement confers oversight power to an
independent government Monitor who will set up a "Work Plan" to
determine whether the servicer is meeting its obligations, largely relying on
information provided by the servicer.52 A servicer has a right to cure
violations, but if a violation goes uncured past the allotted cure period, the
parties or the Monitor may bring an enforcement action seeking specific
performance, and the court may impose civil fines. 5 3
With regard to borrowers, the Settlement Agreement provides,
"Servicer[s] must remediate any material harm to particular borrowers
identified through work conducted under the Work Plan." 54 Additionally,
if this type of error exceeds a threshold rate decided by the Monitor, the
"[s]ervicer shall, under the supervision of the Monitor, identify other
borrowers who may have been harmed by such noncompliance and
remediate all such harms to the extent that the harm has not been otherwise
remediated."5 5 Borrowers may contact their respective state attorneys
general if they believe they are eligible for relief under the Settlement
Agreement; however, this avenue currently only permits claims for cash
restitutions for being improperly foreclosed on.56 Furthermore, the

48. See id (providing that the agreement will resolve certain violations of civil law
based on mortgage loan servicing activities).
49. Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at * 1.
50. See id. at *E-15.
51. See id. at * 1 (naming all states except Oklahoma).

52. See id. at *4, *E-3 (describing that the monitor's duty is to determine whether

the servicer upholds the servicing standards and the methodologies to be utilized to
monitor will be set up through a "Work Plan"); id. at *E-7 to E-9 (stating that the
monitor will collect quarterly reports and the servicer should alert the monitor of any
wrongdoing).
53. See id. at *E- 11 ("Servicer shall have a right to cure any Potential Violation.");
id. at *E-15 (describing that the remedies are up to $1 million for the first violation and
$5 million for the second).
54. See id. at *E-12 (obligating the servicer to remediate any material harm to
borrowers caused by non-compliance).
55. Id.

56. Who May Be Eligible for Assistance, NAT'L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT,
www.nationalmortgagesettlement.con/help (last visited Apr. 26, 2012) (telling
borrowers that attorneys general will be their contact and will be sending them claim
forms).
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Department of Justice announcement of the Settlement Agreement
explains, "The agreement does not prevent any action by individual
borrowers who wish to bring their own lawsuits," without specifying the
origin of this right.57
III. ANALYSIS

The government's contention that the Settlement Agreement does not
prevent individual action is misleading because, under HAMP case law, the
Settlement Agreement does not provide a PRA and does not aggrandize
HAMP and the
borrowers' ability to take action against servicers.
Settlement Agreement are government initiatives that are practically
identical in their purpose and method of implementation.59 Most notably,
both the Settlement Agreement and HAMP came about because servicers
were not providing sufficient modifications to borrowers before forcing
them into foreclosure.60 Both outline what a servicer should consider when
assessing a borrower's application for a modification and the steps to take
in implementing a modification-HAMP does so through SPAs and
MSSCs, while the Settlement Agreement does so through provisions on
servicing standards. 6 1 Both agreements are between governmental parties
62
and servicers of mortgage loans.62 Additionally, the Settlement Agreement,
57. See Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (listing certain parties,
like state attorneys general, whose right to sue will be affected by the agreement); see
also Dayen, supra note 4 (explaining that the releases do not affect homeowners'
ability to sue over foreclosure fraud and other abuses).
58. See, e.g., Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (recognizing that HAMP does
not provide a right of action because its express language says that only parties to the
agreement may bring an enforcement action); see also Settlement Agreement, supra
note 5, at *E-15 (stating that only parties to the agreement may bring an enforcement
action).
59. Compare 12 U.S.C. §§ 5219, 5219a (2012) (providing that HAMP's purpose is
to maximize assistance to homeowners and decrease foreclosures and that servicers
will follow guidelines to determine whether a borrower will qualify for a modification),
with Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (claiming that the Settlement
Agreement's purpose is to address mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure abuses and
servicers will be required to follow new servicing standards when determining whether
to grant a borrower a modification).
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 5219 (seeking to maximize assistance to homeowners by
encouraging servicers to take advantage of programs that minimize foreclosures);
Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *2 (stating that the intention of the agreement is
to remediate harms upon borrowers caused by the servicers).
61. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 5219a (demonstrating a manner in which servicers
should value when making their determination to modify or foreclose), with Settlement
Agreement, supra note 5, at *3, *4, *A-4 (requiring that servicers perform several steps
before they initiate foreclosure).
62. See, e.g., Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS
270, at *14 (Dec. 15, 2011) (quoting Alpino v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'l Ass'n,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43210, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Apr. 21, 2011)) (explaining that SPAs
are agreements between servicers and Fannie Mae, in its capacity as a financial agent
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as well as HAMP and derivative agreements such as SPAs and MSSCs,
serve to benefit borrowers who qualify for a modification under the
government's suggested guidelines. 63 However, under HAMP and the
Settlement Agreement, if the servicers do not comply with established
guidelines and deny a loan modification that should have been granted,
borrowers do not have a PRA to sue the servicer because this right is not
expressly provided and borrowers have not been deemed intended nonparty beneficiaries.64
A. Borrowers Will Not Be Able to Sue Servicers Who Do Not Comply with
the Settlement Agreement Because the Settlement Agreement Does Not
Expressly Confer a PRA to Borrowers
Courts will almost certainly continue to find that the government did not
intend to provide borrowers with a PRA in the Settlement Agreement, as it
did not make borrowers parties nor expressly provide borrowers a separate
cause of action for violations of the agreement.
In Markle, Parker, and
Rivera, the courts held that borrowers could not bring actions for violations
of the HAMP agreements without being a party to the agreement.6
Based on precedent, courts will find that the terms of the Settlement
Agreement are clear and will ascertain the parties' intent that borrowers
cannot sue for violations of the Settlement Agreement. 6 7 Under a Markle
analysis, the plain language of the Settlement Agreement fails to name
borrowers as parties and to confer an express right to the borrowers in its
for the United States); see Settlement Agreement, supranote 5, at * 1 (listing the United
States, forty-nine states, and five servicers as parties to the agreement).
63. Compare Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 ("Plaintiffs are
undoubtedly correct that they are within the class of individuals that Congress and the
Treasury Department intended to benefit by ... creating HAMP."), with Settlement
Agreement, supra note 5, at *2 ("[T]he intention of the United States and the States in
effecting this settlement is to remediate harms allegedly resulting from the alleged
unlawful conduct of the [Servicer.]").

64. Compare Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, No. 09-cv-2450(LB), 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *20-21 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2011) (stating that borrowers under
HAMP are not intended beneficiaries, but merely incidental beneficiaries because the
SPA does not include them as parties and the SPA's remedies are reserved to the
parties), with Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (reserving the cause of
action and remedies to parties to the agreement).
65. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (stating that any party to the
agreement or the monitor may bring an enforcement action under this agreement).
66. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 (providing that borrowers
are not parties to MSSCs and cannot bring an action unless the parties intended them to
be beneficiaries to the agreement); Parker, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *10-11
(denying the borrower standing to bring a first-party claim to the SPA); Rivera, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17 (dismissing the action because the SPA did not name
the borrowers).
67. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *18 (citing to the rule that states
that if the language is unclear, the court may look for the parties' intent on the
reasonableness of the putative beneficiary's reliance of the promise).
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The enforcement clause in the Settlement
enforcement clause.68
Agreement, like the enforcement clause in the MSSC, does not give
borrowers the right to enforce the agreement; it only gives this power to the
parties to the agreement and the Monitor.6 9 Courts applying the Rivera
analysis would come to the same conclusion about the Settlement
Agreement's enforcement clause, because in that case, the court found that
the SPA's enforcement clause also precludes borrowers from bringing an
action by failing to name them.70
Borrowers may point to another part of the Settlement Agreement that
obligates servicers to compensate borrowers for harm that servicers have
caused for failing to follow the terms of the Settlement Agreement.7 1
Borrowers may argue that this clause does not go as far as the MSSC
clause that expressly excludes borrowers from bringing actions, and thus, it
supports a finding that the parties intended to give borrowers enforcement
rights.72 However, this clause does not give borrowers a right of action
under the law established by Markle and Rivera because it expressly gives
the Monitor and the servicer the sole power to identify the borrower and
provides the Monitor the ability to collect damages when it brings an
enforcement action.73 Courts will look to the identity of the parties in the
Settlement Agreement as well as the plain meaning of its clauses, as courts
have done with HAMP and its agreements; likely, the courts will not find
that the Settlement Agreement gives borrowers any enforcement rights,
even if they stand to be harmed by violations.74
68. See id. at * 19-20 (citing from the agreement that no borrower is intended to be
a legal beneficiary of the MSSC or to obtain any rights through Fannie Mae's lender
contracts).
69. Compare id. at * 19 ("These rights and remedies are for our benefit and that of
our successors and assigns."), with Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E- 15 ("An
enforcement action under this Consent Judgment may be brought by any Party to this
Consent Judgment or the Monitoring Committee.").
70. See Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17 (holding that the SPA's
provisions did not expressly grant the borrower enforce power and remedies were
solely available to the government).
71. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-12 (obligating servicers to pay
reparations to borrowers in addition to the civil penalties they have to pay for identified
violations).
72. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-12 ("Servicer must remediate
any material harm to particular borrowers identified through work conducted under the
Work Plan."). Contra Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 (citing to section
A2- 1-01 of the selling guide where the agreement expressly prohibited borrowers from
suing servicers).
73. Compare Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19-20 (stating that the
plain language of the clause does not give borrowers rights under the MSSC), and
Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *18 (noting that remedies to the agreement
were solely available to the government), with Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at
*E-12 (recognizing that the government will supervise the reparation).
74. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19-20 (looking to the plain
language of the MSSC); Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17-18 (looking to
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B. Borrowers Will Not Be Able to Sue Servicers Who DidNot Perform
According to the Settlement Agreement Because Borrowers Will Not Be
Deemed Intended Non-Party Beneficiaries
Courts will also analyze the Settlement Agreement using the
Restatement of Contracts because it is a part-federal and part-state
government contract. 5 Based on established case law that uses the
Restatement to analyze HAMP's agreements, borrowers under the
Settlement Agreement are not intended "third-party" or "non-party"
beneficiaries with enforcement powers because, even though the
government intended that they benefit from the Settlement Agreement, they
will not be able to overcome the presumption that they are only incidental
parties to a government contract. Borrowers who are set to benefit from
the Settlement Agreement will be unlikely to be able to overcome this
presumption as well because the Settlement Agreement and the policy
behind it do not support a borrower's status as an intended beneficiary.
Even though borrowers under the Settlement Agreement may be able to
meet the Restatement's designation of "intended beneficiary," courts will
presume them to be incidental beneficiaries under the Restatement, which
provides that members of the public are incidental beneficiaries.78 The
precedent established by Markle, Rivera, and Parker indicates that courts
will likely find that the government intended to provide a benefit to
borrowers through the Settlement Agreement under the Restatement
the enforcement clause of the SPA and finding that the makers of the agreement did not
mention borrowers).
75. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *14, 16 (noting that federal
common law controls the interpretation of contracts entered into pursuant to federal law

and to which the United States is a party and that Massachusetts and federal common
law both follow the Restatement); Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *12
(finding that whether a plaintiff is a beneficiary to a government agreement is a
question of federal law, which follows the Restatement).
76. CompareMarkle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21 (finding that there is a
difference between parties that are incidental, and therefore benefit from an agreement,
and parties who are not beneficiaries who have rights under the agreement), and
Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *15, 17 (finding that HAMP intended to give
borrowers the benefit from the agreement but not contractual rights under the
agreement), with Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (announcing that
the purpose of the agreement was to help borrowers receive more modifications on
their home loans).
77. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21-22 (listing numerous courts
that did not find that parties to the MSSC and SPA were intended beneficiaries);
Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (giving enforcement power only to the
parties of the agreement, without mentioning borrowers).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1981) (providing that an
"intended beneficiary" is one who has a right to performance by the promisee and "the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of
the promised performance"); see also Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19
(stating that the restatement presumes a citizen benefitting from a government contract
is an incidental beneficiary absent clear intent to the contrary).
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(Second) of Contracts section 302(1).79 Servicers who are parties to the
Settlement Agreement are required to perform under its provisions and the
servicers intend to give borrowers the benefit of this performance.so This,
however, does not give borrowers enforcement rights under the Settlement
Agreement because of the incidental-beneficiaries analysis.8 1
Borrowers under the Settlement Agreement will be presumed incidental
beneficiaries under the Restatement, which states that public citizens-as
the court found the borrowers in Markle and Rivera to be-are incidental
parties.82 As incidental beneficiaries, borrowers under the Settlement
Agreement are not entitled to enforcement rights.83
Borrowers under the Settlement Agreement have the opportunity to rebut
the presumption that they are not mere incidental beneficiaries under the
Restatement but, based on precedent, courts will find that the Settlement
Agreement itself or the policy behind it, like with the MSSC and the SPA,
does not support a borrower's status as an intended non-party beneficiary. 84
79. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (defining an
intended beneficiary as a person who is owed a promise of performance and to whom
the promisor intends to give the benefit of the promise), with Settlement Agreement
Announcement, supra note 1 (stating that the servicers will be required to review every
borrower's qualifications for a modification and provide one if the borrower meets the
criteria).
80. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 ("Plaintiffs are undoubtedly
correct that they are within the class of individuals that Congress and the Treasury
Department intended to benefit by enacting the EESA and creating HAMP."); Rivera,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *15 ("This Court agrees that the Agreement
'expresses a clear intent to directly benefit the eligible borrowers."'); Parker v. Bank of
Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *22 (Dec. 15, 2011) ("It
seems undeniable that the performance required of servicers who entered into SPAs
was intended for the direct benefit of borrowers struggling to pay first
mortgages .... ); Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 ("[T]he
servicers are required to collectively dedicate $20 billion toward various forms of
financial relief to borrowers[, including] ... reducing the principal on loans for
borrowers who .. . are either delinquent or at imminent risk of default and owe more on
their mortgages than their homes are worth.").
81. Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *12-14 (examining first the section in
the Restatement regarding the difference between intended and incidental beneficiaries,
and then the section of the Restatement regarding government contracts).
82. Compare Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *18 (stating that if the
terms of the contract are clear, the contract itself should ascertain the parties' intent),
and Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17 ("[T]he terms of the Agreement
make plain that the parties to the Agreement did not intend for borrowers to enforce the
contract."), with Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (recognizing that the
parties to the agreement may enforce it).
83. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *18 (distinguishing incidental
beneficiaries who do not have enforcement powers and intended beneficiaries who do);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (providing that to overcome the
presumption, a non-party to the government agreement must show that the contract
itself or the policy behind it would support the status of intended beneficiary).
84. See Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21 ("Finding such a broad and
indefinite a class of third-party beneficiaries would be inconsistent with the clear intent
standard for government contracts . . . .").
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Applying the precedent set forth in Markle, the Settlement Agreement, like
the MSSC, is clear as to who are the parties to the agreement and does not
Similarly, applying the
expressly give borrowers a right of action.
like the SPA,
Settlement
Agreement,
in
Rivera,
the
holding established
and the
Agreement
the
does not expressly allow borrowers to enforce
86
Although the
remedies listed are solely available to the government.
Settlement Agreement is intended to benefit borrowers, its policy of
restricting borrower litigation by not naming them parties is consistent with
the Restatement.8 7
It is highly unlikely that courts will follow Parker-acase that has not
been formally overturned but has been rendered functionally immaterialwhich found that borrowers have standing to bring an action for breach of
88
the Settlement Agreement based on a non-party beneficiary theory. The
finding in Parker may lead courts to determine that borrowers under the
Settlement Agreement meet the requirements of the Restatement's
definition of intended beneficiary because servicers are required to perform
under the Settlement Agreement and that performance is intended for the
direct benefit of borrowers struggling to pay their mortgages. 8 9 The Parker
court, however, did not give the government contracts section of the
Restatement proper support, and instead, exclusively focused on the section
of the Restatement that defined an intended beneficiary.90 The law
established in Parker, which has since been rendered irrelevant, does not
establish that borrowers benefitting from the Settlement Agreement can
overcome the presumption that they are merely incidental beneficiaries

85. See id. at *20 (holding that even if the MSSC intended to benefit the borrowers,
it did not intend to give them enforcement rights that belonged to the parties that enter
the agreement); Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (noting that only the
governmental parties and the servicers can bring causes of action under the agreement).
86. Compare Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138 at *17-18 (noting that the
SPA's enforcement clause only permitted parties and their successors to enforce the
agreement and the remedies for default were only available to the government), with
Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E- 15 (stating that the parties to the agreement
can bring enforcement action and receive relief in the form of specific performance and
civil penalties).
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981) (maintaining that
non-parties to government agreements are incidental parties unless they overcome this
presumption).
88. See supra note 43 (naming the only three courts that have cited to Parker but
not directly followed it).
89. See Settlement Agreement Announcement, supra note 1 (maintaining that the
agreement would remedy the injustices that borrowers faced when they qualified for
modifications on their underwater homes).
90. See Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270,
at *22 (Dec. 15, 2011) (reasoning that the SPA intended to make borrowers
beneficiaries and additional but incidental benefits would accrue to the economy as a
whole).
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because there is no clear intent to the contrary.9 1 A court, like the court in
Parker, may find that the Settlement Agreement clearly intends to make
borrowers intended beneficiaries by not expressly preventing borrowers
from suing as the MSSC did in Markle, but borrowers are not parties to the
Settlement Agreement and have no contract remedies under a Rivera
analysis. 92 The second reason that the Parkercourt gave for finding a clear
intent to make borrowers beneficiaries, that they did not have an alternative
forum to bring their claims, is not present under the Settlement Agreement
because borrowers can bring claims to their state attorney general's
attention.
For the above reasons, arguments that the government intended to make
borrowers parties fail, even in sympathetic courts, because the law is
clear.9 4 The reasoning set forth in Markle and Rivera has broad support
from district courts across the country, while Parker does not. 9 5 The
analysis in Parkeris not only based on overturned law, but borrowers must
also overcome the presumption that they are not merely incidental parties
to government contracts according to current case law. 96

91. See id at *25-28 (finding a clear intent, in that the SPA did not expressly
prevent borrowers from suing and borrowers had no other forum to bring their claims).
92. Compare Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *19-20 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (acknowledging that the
MSSC expressly said that borrowers cannot sue), and Rivera v. Bank of Am. Home
Loans, No. 09-cv-2450(LB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17-18 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
21, 2011) (finding that the parties expressly did not give borrowers enforcement rights
and ability to seek remedies), with Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-12
(giving borrowers an alternative forum in which to bring claims outside the
enforcement of the agreement).
93. Compare Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20 (citing to the MSSC
Selling Guide that precluded borrowers from suing servicers), and Rivera, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *17-18 (citing the SPA that the enforcement clause only
permitted parties to enforce the agreement), with Parker, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS
270, at *25-28 (opining that borrowers without a forum would mock the goals of a

program intended to benefit them), and Who May Be Eligiblefor Assistance, supra

note 56 (instructing borrowers to contact their respective state attorney general if they
believe they are eligible for relief).
94. See Rivera, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43138, at *2 (expressing that a borrower
seeking a modification from an unresponsive bank represents "an unfortunate, but all
too common set of circumstances in the world today[,]" before dismissing the case).
95. See supra note 17 (listing cases from across the country supporting Markle and
Rivera and few but non-binding support for Parker).
96. See Cade v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. H-10-4224, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65045, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2011) (recognizing that the relied-upon cases

has been reversed by the Supreme Court in County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 1342 (2011)); see also Marques v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., No.

09-cv-1985-L(RBB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81879, at *19 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2010);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (1981) (indicating that the contract

itself or the policy behind it would support the status of intended beneficiary).
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Settlement Agreement must overcome the problems created by the
lack of private enforcement that were also present in HAMP and in
settlements geared to alleviate borrowers' fear of foreclosure because they
The government failed to oversee
can no longer afford their homes.
HAMP's progress from its implementation and did not fully use its
enforcement power to penalize banks that improperly foreclosed on
borrowers. 98 In order for the Settlement Agreement to succeed, it will have
to avoid the implementation and enforcement failures experienced by
HAMP, but there are already several issues in the Settlement Agreement's
text that have the potential to weaken its authority.
The first issue deals with the topic of this Recent Development:
99
borrowers lack the right to self-enforce the Settlement Agreement. The
government has not shown that it properly enforces these types of
agreements and the Settlement Agreement has troubling provisions that
will delay its enforcement.100 For example, the government has and will
spend too much time setting up a "Work Plan" to determine whether a
servicer violated the Settlement Agreement, will first allow the servicer to
cure a violation, and will seek remedies for uncured violations only after
the cure period has run out. 0 1 In addition, the remedies the government
97. See Parker, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS 270, at *18-19 (Dec. 15, 2011)
(designating the lack of an enforcement as a significant flaw of HAMP); Paul Kiel,
Secret Docs Show Foreclosure Watchdog Doesn't Bark or Bite, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 4,
11:26 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/secret-docs-on-foreclosure2011,

watchdog (explaining that HAMP has been ineffective because the government's
supervision has been severely lacking); Dayen, supra note 4 (naming several other
lawsuits and settlement agreements where the servicer failed to follow its obligations
due to lack of enforcement).

98. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM, FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT

FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 14 (2010) (finding that the government had yet
to establish specific consequences for HAMP violations, making enforcement
inconsistent); Kiel, supra note 97 (reporting that documents showed that the
government had not audited a servicer for the first eight months of a program and when
it finally did, the audit showed severe violations but the government did not force the
servicer to reverse any foreclosure); OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
available at
(2010),
9
PROGRAM
MODIFICATION
AFFORDABLE
HOME

http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2010/FactorsAffectingImplementationofthe

Home Affordable Modification Program.pdf (criticizing that program's projected

goal of helping three to four miflion Americans receive modifications on their loans is
an overstatement due to poor implementation, and the actual number of people it will
help is closer to one and one-half to two million, some of which will likely re-default
on their loan).

99. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-15 (conveying that only parties
to the agreement can bring an enforcement action).
100. See supra note 98 (listing articles and government summaries reporting that
numerous programs and other settlement agreements have failed).
101. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-3 (delegating a monitor to
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can seek may not be strong deterrents against non-compliance.10 2 For
example, the Settlement Agreement has a section granting servicers the
right to cure violations and another section providing that the court "may"
impose penalties for continuous violations.'03 Critics rightly note that
violating the law has merely become a banker's cost of doing business, and
such provisions incentivize servicers to test the limits of their compliance
before the government subjects them to any penalties.10 4 For this reason,
the government should have provided a more robust private enforcement
mechanism in this Settlement Agreement or should enact legislation that
has more immediate consequences for servicers in violation of the
agreement in order to deter recurring non-compliance. Although the
Markle court makes a well-taken point that giving borrowers such a power
would open servicers to much litigation, it may be the only viable solution
to this enforcement issue unless the government truly stands behind its
enforcement power. os
Even though the Settlement Agreement has tried to address HAMP's
lack of an alternative forum to remedy the harm that befalls borrowers
when servicers wrongfully deny them modifications, by obligating
servicers to do so, it first allows servicers to cure the violation and then
self-identify the harmed borrowers.' 0 6 This method of enforcement lacks
accountability because, first, there is no clear complaint filing mechanism
that the government has provided to harmed borrowers, and second, the
government will determine compliance through servicer self-

determine whether the servicer upholds the servicing standards through a "Work
Plan"); id. at *E- 11 (giving servicer the right to cure violations); id. at *E- 15 (stating
that servicer will be penalized up to $1 million for the first uncured violation, and the
second with $5 million, not including borrower damages).
102. See Barry Ritholtz, Foreclosure Settlement a Failure of Law, a Triumph for

Bank Attorneys, WASH. PosT (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
foreclosure-settlement-a-failure-of-law-a-triumph-for-bank-attomeys/2012/02/23/
glQAe7feaR story.html (arguing that a monetary fine will not do enough to cover the
crime committed).
103. See Settlement Ageement, supra note 5, at *E- 1 (granting servicers the right
to cure any potential violation); id. at *E-15 (stating that the court may impose civil
penalties where the final uncured Potential Violation involves widespread
noncompliance).
104. See Kiel, supra note 97 (stating that the government under HAMP sent mixed
messages about how they would penalize servicers for violations).
105. See Markle v. HSBC Mortgage Corp., No. 10-40189-FDS, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 147349, at *21 (D. Mass. July 12, 2011) (warning that "[flinding such a broad
and indefinite a class of third-party beneficiaries would be inconsistent" with
government-contracts law).
106. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 5, at *E-12 (obligating servicers to pay
damages to borrowers in addition to the civil penalties). Contra Markle, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *21 (stating that HAMP did not provide borrowers a forum to
have their claims heard).
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assessments.10 7 The website of the Settlement Agreement provides
borrowers the only indication regarding filing a claim for relief, but it deals
with past actions.' 08 The fact that this misconduct has continued for four
years garners distrust amongst borrowers and calls into question the
legitimacy of self-assessments.' 09 Granting borrowers a right of action will
remedy the lack of servicer accountability because borrowers already have
a forum, the courts, and access to the Settlement Agreement that can be
used to identify wrongdoing.
V. CONCLUSION

Based on settled precedent regarding a PRA under HAMP, the
government's promise that borrowers are not prevented from bringing their
own lawsuits is an empty one if the borrowers' actions are based on
violations of the Settlement Agreement."10 Although drafters of the
Settlement Agreement attempted to address the lack of enforcement that
brought down its predecessors, the Settlement Agreement's own provisions
contain flaws that will very likely cause it to join other failing initiatives,
like HAMP." A law with a PRA would most likely resolve this problem,
but the government is currently not willing to take this step, leaving
borrowers to question whether they will truly benefit from the Settlement
Agreement, as unequivocally intended."12

107. See Dayen, supra note 4 (critiquing that the quarterly self-assessment from the
banks will take time to review and take action against).
108. See Who May Be Eligible for Assistance, supra note 56 (concerning cash

restitutions for borrowers who have been foreclosed on during the past three years).
109. See Morgenson, supra note 3 (claiming it will be hard for borrowers to restore
their trust in servicers given what borrowers came to know about their practices).
110. See, e.g., Markle, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147349, at *20, 21-22 (holding that
HAMP did not confer to borrowers the right of action to violations of an agreement
between a servicer and the government and that the majority of courts agree).
111. See Dayen, supra note 4 (listing programs and settlement agreements that have
failed due to lack of enforcement in their implementation).
112. See, e.g., Parker v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 11-1838, 2011 Mass. Super. LEXIS
270, at *26 (Dec. 15, 2011) (holding that denying borrowers the status of a non-party
beneficiary under HAMP would "'mock the very goals of' the program that the
contract was intened to further, placing its 'legitimacy . . . in grave doubt"' (internal

citations omitted)).
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